The Accident and its Causes: Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle (Metaphysics E 3)

Pseudo-Alexander\u2019s commentary in Metaphysics \u395 3 is one of the three ancient commentaries which came down to us together with Ascepius\u2019s commentary and Pseudo-Philoponus\u2019s one, in Latin. Pseudo-Alexander\u2019s work, in particular, constitutes the source of interpretation of the Aristotelian text for many modern scholars. In chapter 3 Aristotle shows that there are causes of accidental being, which are generable and destructible without ever being in course of being generated or destroyed. This problem is one of the most difficult and controversial for Aristotle. The thesis is explained by Aristotle with examples concerning past and future events. Pseudo-Alexander considers them as referring to accidental causes. The exegete\u2019s explanation of both cases introduces some elements which are totally extraneous to the Aristotelian text, but nevertheless it could be helpful to cast some light on the understanding of the most controversial passages. In the final passage, Aristotle raises the question of what kind of cause the accident leads to, whether to the material or to the final or to the efficient cause. It is apparently left without an answer. Pseudo-Alexander gives a plausible solution, which is nonetheless probably only partial. The chapter was also examined with reference to the problem of determinism in Aristotle

On the omniscience of Aristotle\u2019s unmoved mover: a note on Metaphysics \u39b 4, 1070 b 34-35

This paper focuses on the final passage of Metaphysics \u39b 4, which contains the first explicit mention of the unmoved mover in book \u39b. The sentence is crucial for the problem of what, if anything, the Aristotelian god knows about the world. The author starts with a general enumeration of the main interpretations of the problem of the omniscience of god, which either admit a divine activity upon the world (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Thomas Aquinas), or that, by thinking himself, god thinks everything (Thomas Aquinas) or that, in knowing himself, he knows beings (Averro\uebs), or, finally, state that god knows only himself (Schwegler, Bonitz, Zeller, Ross and many others). In this section the importance of Metaphysics \u39b 9 has been stressed, which constitutes the only complete text on the topic which has come down to us, and where Aristotle, as it is well known, denies that god has knowledge of the world. \u39b 9 is, therefore, an essential and necessary reference for any other passage which contains a mention of the matter in question. In the following section, the paper analyzes the context in which the final passage of \u39b 4 is inserted. The attempt is to show that the reference to the unmoved movers in \u39b 4 is not introduced abruptly, but rather that it fits perfectly in the discussion of the chapter. The third section contains the analysis of the passage. In particular, the suggestion proposed by R. George is considered, who, after having recalled F. Brentano\u2019s position, asserts that the sentence would imply that the first of all things contains within itself the formal principle of what it brings forth, and that, since the first mover moves all things, it actually is all things. This paper aims to show that the first cause of all things, whose mention follows the enumeration of the four causes \u2013 matter, form and privation as 2 immanent elements, and the moving cause of natural substance as external principle \u2013, is not within the coincidence of formal and moving cause. Therefore the case of the proximate moving cause (for example the builder), which knows its effect (for example the form of the house), appears as different from the case of the first remote moving cause which moves all things, which does not seem to have knowledge of the world. This paper suggests that the coincidence between the formal and the moving cause may only work for natural substances and, therefore, for the moving cause in the weaker sense, while it does not apply to the remote moving cause. In this perspective the fact that the Aristotelian god cannot be a formal cause plays a fundamental role, being an external and separated principle. Consequently, the role of the mention of the unmoved mover in the final passage of \u39b 4 does not appear as a reference which is completely detached from the rest of the text, but it seems to perfectly fit in it and indeed appears to play a central role in the entire chapter

The Notion of Being as Act in Neoplatonism and Its Transmission in the Translatio Studiorum

The problem related to the origin of the concept of actus essendi constitutes one of the central themes in the history of ancient philosophy, and is one of the most important in the process known as Translatio studiorum. The idea according to which Thomas Aquinas was the first to consider this concept has been contrasted to the idea that actus essendi had already been present in Neoplatonism. In fact, the concept of \u201cbeing\u201d in Thomas Aquinas\u2019 philosophy has been interpreted in many different ways over the years, especially in relation to Aristotle\u2019s concept of being. In his book about being according to Thomas, G. Ventimiglia recognizes three generations within the historiography on Thomistic ontology. The first generation, begun by R. Garrigou-Lagrange, lasted until the end of the 1930s and maintained that the being of Thomas equalled Aristotle\u2019s. During the second generation, lasting from the beginning of the 1930s till the end of the \u201950s and whose main exponent was E. Gilson, the being of Thomas is seen as the actus essendi. These scholars therefore interpreted it as a completely new and original concept compared to both Aristotle\u2019s being and the Neoplatonic school of thought, by which Thomas may have been influenced. Lastly, the third generation, in which Thomas\u2019 concept of being is considered to be unoriginal, having been elaborated within the world of Neoplatonism, originated at the beginning of the 1970s and lasts yet today. W. Beierwaltes and K. Kremer, among others, have lead this final generation. However, together with Ventimiglia, it is necessary to recognize the importance that the publication of two other works had on the assertion made by the \u201cthird generation\u201d. These works are P. Hadot\u2019s volume on Porphyre et Victorinus, published in 1968 and Beierwaltes\u2019 book entitled Platonismus und Idealismus, published in 1972. In the latter\u2019s book, the author demonstrates that the identification of God with being had been made by Plutarch and Porphyry as well as by Philo of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Victorinus and Augustine. In Hadot\u2019s volume, together with the observation that this identification had been expressed in Neoplatonism, also the definition of being as act is traced back to the same period. In the paper it is discussed the section of Hadot\u2019s study which appears in the appendix of the second volume, containing the text and the translation of the fragments of the anony\uacmous commentary to Plato\u2019s Parmenides. It also considered the introductory essay added in the Italian translation of this section. It is thanks to Hadot and the exponents of Ventimiglia\u2019s \u201cthird generation\u201d that the communis opinio, according to which the concept of actus essendi can be found first in the philosophy of Thomas, was disproved. Hadot in particular demonstrated that the notion of \u201cact of being\u201d originated from both the anonymous commentary to the Parmenides by Plato, which he attributes to Porphyry, and the Enneads by Plotinus. This paper will first examine the fragments of the commentary in order to show that in it may be found both the identification of God with being and the concept of being as actus essendi. An analysis of Enneads VI 8, 7 will follow. This is one of the passages in the work by Plotinus which most deserves to be considered in order to verify the effective anticipation of Neoplatonism in a doctrine that has traditionally been considered of Thomistic origin. Finally, of particular interest is the comparison between being as interpreted by Neoplatonism, especially by Plotinus, and act as conceived by Aristotle, unanimously recognized as its discoverer

Is Aristotle's place really a surface? On Aristotle's concept of place in Physics IV and Categories 6

The attribution to Aristotle of the concept of place as bi-dimensional is firstly based on the identification of place with a surface, supposedly carried out by Aristotle in Physics IV. The identity of place with surface would indeed imply that place were missing the third dimension of depth, for the notion of surface was historically related to the notion of plane. Hence, since natural beings are, by definition, moving beings, and they have a three-dimensional extension, the doctrine of the bi-dimensionality of place would imply the impossibility to explain movement. Depth of place also seems to be neglected in another passage, in which Aristotle rejects the third definition of place as an extension between the extremities of the contained body. Scholars who admit the bidimensionality of Aristotelian place emphasize the contrast between the Aristotelian theory of place expounded in Physics and the theory contained in Categories, where the three-dimensionality of place is explicitly admitted. The aim of this paper is to try to convey additional arguments in favour of the three-dimensionality of Aristotelian place, based on the criterion of a more literal reading of the Aristotelian text

The Unity of Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics: Book \u395 according to the Interpretation of the Ancient Commentators

This paper discusses the three ancient commentaries on Book E of Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics, that have been handed down to us. It aims to demonstrate the fundamental part played by their particular interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s doctrines in the birth of the traditional interpretation of his Metaphysics, according to which all the books comprising the work were written as a function of Book \u39b, containing the well-known doctrine of the unmoved mover. Among the main elements supporting this assumption there is Aristotle\u2019s distinction between three types of science - the theoretical, the practical and the productive - and his claiming the primacy of metaphysics as a theological science. According to the ancient commentators, the remainder of Book E would belong to the unitary project of the Metaphysics, since it would indicate what is not encompassed in the object of metaphysics. This would mean that Aristotle\u2019s treatment of accidental being, being as truth and not-being as falsity, and being potentially and actually would take on a negative function. The theological interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics thus retains its ultimate foundations in premises contained in the Aristotelian text itself

The Unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Book Ε According to the Interpretation of the Ancient Commentators

This paper discusses the three ancient commentaries on Book E of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, that have been handed down to us. It aims to demonstrate the fundamental part played by their particular interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrines in the birth of the traditional interpretation of his Metaphysics, according to which all the books comprising the work were written as a function of Book Λ, containing the well-known doctrine of the unmoved mover. Among the main elements supporting this assumption there is Aristotle’s distinction between three types of science - the theoretical, the practical and the productive - and his claiming the primacy of metaphysics as a theological science. According to the ancient commentators, the remainder of Book E would belong to the unitary project of the Metaphysics, since it would indicate what is not encompassed in the object of metaphysics. This would mean that Aristotle’s treatment of accidental being, being as truth and not-being as falsity, and being potentially and actually would take on a negative function. The theological interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics thus retains its ultimate foundations in premises contained in the Aristotelian text itsel

La causalidad del motor inm\uf3vil seg\ufan Pseudo-Alejandro

La causalidad del motor inm\uf3vil en Arist\uf3teles ha constituido uno de los temas mayormente debatidos y a\ufan no resueltos. Ya los comentadores antiguos, comenzando por Teofrasto, disc\uedpulo directo de Arist\uf3teles, relevaron la problematicidad del modo en el que el motor inm\uf3vil mueve directamente el cielo de las estrellas fijas e indirectamente las otras esferas y, por tanto, la problematicidad del papel que se atribuye al primer motor: puesto que \ue9l no es ni causa material ni causa formal, resta que la suya sea una causalidad eficiente o una causalidad final. El lugar en el que Arist\uf3teles trata acerca del modo en que el motor inm\uf3vil produce el movimiento es in primis el libro Lambda de la Metaf\uedsica. En la antig\ufcedad y hasta el siglo XX dicho libro se ha considerado como aquel en el cual Arist\uf3teles habr\ueda expuesto su \u201cteolog\ueda\u201d, esto es, su concepci\uf3n del theos, t\ue9rmino que habitualmente era traducido por quienes sosten\uedan la interpretaci\uf3n tradicional por \u201cDios\u201d, escrito con \u201cD\u201d may\ufascula y sin art\uedculo. La presente indagaci\uf3n se centra en la interpretaci\uf3n que sobre la cuesti\uf3n ha dado uno de los comentadores de Arist\uf3teles, conocido como pseudo-Alejandro, quien, despu\ue9s de haber sido considerado por largo tiempo un neoplat\uf3nico, fue ubicado recientemente a caballo entre los siglos XI y XII, e identificado con el bizantino Miguel de \uc9feso. El inter\ue9s por la interpretaci\uf3n de pseudo-Alejandro deriva de su originalidad respecto de la ex\ue9gesis tradicional, inaugurada por Alejandro de Afrodisia en el siglo II d.C. Aun permaneciendo fiel a la atribuci\uf3n de una causalidad final al motor inm\uf3vil, introduce un importante elemento de novedad que hace de su posici\uf3n un unicum en la historia de la tradici\uf3n aristot\ue9lica. El an\ue1lisis de la interpretaci\uf3n de pseudo-Alejandro se conecta adem\ue1s con el problema de la relaci\uf3n entre su comentario al libro Lambda de la Metaf\uedsica y el comentario perdido de Alejandro de Afrodisia al mismo libro

Aristotele, Categorie, 14. Il movimento e le sue specie

Il capitolo 14 delle Categorie di Aristotele \ue8 dedicato al movimento. Esso dunque non ha a tema una delle categorie, bens\uec un altro tipo di realt\ue0 al quale le categorie, o almeno alcune di esse, sono certamente legate, appunto il movimento. Il contributo analizza il testo aristotelico, a partire dalle diverse proposte di soluzione al problema della giustificazione dell'oggetto di Cat. 14, avanzate sia nel contesto della tradizione commentaristica antica sia dagli studiosi moderni, e dallle questioni pi\uf9 importanti presenti nella trattazione aristotelica, per esempio l'uso del termine kinesis per indicare il mutamento e il problema della differenza tra i movimento

I movimenti dei corpi celesti nel commento dello pseudo-Alessandro alla \uabMetafisica\ubb di Aristotele

Il contributo analizza il commento di pseudo-Alessandro al capitolo VIII del libro Lambda della Metafisica di Aristotele, in cui si espone la dottrina aristotelica delle sfere controagenti e si descrivono i sistemi astronomici di Eudosso e Callippo. In particolare si identifica la fonte della spiegazione di pseudo Alessandro relativamente al sistema di Eudosso nel commentario di Simplicio al De Caelo di Aristotele

Aristotele, Categorie, 15. La categoria dell' 'avere'

L'avere \ue8 l'ultima delle categorie trattate nell'opera omonima di Aristotele. Essa non compare tuttavia prima del cap. 10, che apre i Postpredicamenta. Il contributo mostra che, bench\ue9 l'enumerazione degli otti significati dell'avere in Cat. 15 non manifesti la complessit\ue0 della trattazione aristotelica della dottrina delle categorie, nondimeno quest'ultima vi \ue8 certamente contenuta. Ci\uf2 depone anche a favore dell'autenticit\ue0 di questa sezione dei Postpredicamenta